Abstract. The evolution of wireless access technologies and the capabilities of today's mobile devices lead to an increasing demand of communication bandwidth. More and more packet-switched wireless access networks like Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) and networks based on Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) are publicly available and operated by different providers. In order to achieve a high network coverage isolated access network providers are supposed to co-operate and to support handovers for users from access networks belonging to the same core network. Efficient authentication mechanisms are required that on the one hand exclude unauthorized users from the network and on the other hand support seamless handovers across access network boundaries. We propose a ticket-based fast re-authentication scheme that is independent from the actual authentication method and that only slightly modifies well-established standards like the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) and the Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS). As it is network technology independent, it in principle also allows fast handovers across different access network technologies.
Introduction
Mobility is one of the main incentives for the development of wireless network technologies such as Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) based on IEEE 802.11 or Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) based on IEEE 802.16. In general, a wireless network is subdivided into one or more access networks and a core network that do not need to belong to the same network operator. An access network consists of link-layer (L2) devices, whereas a core network consists of network-layer (L3) devices. The device the link layer of a mobile device attaches to is called L2 Point of Attachment (PoA) (Access Point (AP) in WLANs, Base Station (BS) in WiMAX networks), the device the network layer of a mobile device attaches to is called L3 PoA (Access Router (AR) in WLANs, Access Services Network Gateway (ASN-GW) in WiMAX networks).
In both technologies, access network mobility is in general provided by the technology itself, i.e. a handover (HO) between PoAs belonging to the same access network does not require any higher-layer mobility solution. Core network mobility, i.e. a HO across access network boundaries, is in general based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or on Multi-Protocol Label Switching (MPLS) and goes along with a reconfiguration in the core network in order to redirect packets to the new PoA.
Mobility is a user-specific network service that has to be secured from attackers and therefore requires an authentication mechanism. In order to support real-time packet-switched applications such as Voice over IP (VoIP), the HO from an old PoA to a new PoA and the associated re-authentication with the new PoA has to be as fast as possible. The objective of this paper is to provide a fast re-authentication mechanism to support core network mobility.
In general, the mobile device authenticates with an Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) server in the core network. Also, authentication is reasonably performed before obtaining network-layer connectivity, i.e. before the assignment of an IP address. Therefore, an intermediate device is necessary to handle the authentication between the mobile device and the AAA server. In WLANs based on IEEE 802.11i this is the L2 PoA. In WLANs based on IEEE 802.11 only, the L2 PoA cannot act as intermediate device so that the L3 PoA has to be used.
During HO, a HO notification message has to be sent to the core network (e.g. by exploiting the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol [1] , which is an extensible protocol used for configuration purposes). We propose a predictive HO solution, i.e. the HO notification is sent to the L3 PoA the mobile device is attached to before it moves to the new access network. The advantage compared to reactive HO solutions in which HO notifications are sent to the new L3 PoA is that the disassociation from the old access network and the transfer of configuration information from the old L3 PoA to the new L3 PoA can be done in parallel.
In order to accelerate the authentication process during HO we propose a ticket mechanism providing a fast re-authentication of mobile nodes with the target access network. We define an additional RADIUS attribute and use the optional data field of EAP-Identity-Messages.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2 we summarize EAP-TLS with RADIUS as an example scenario to which the re-authentication scheme can be applied. In Sect. 3 we define the attacker model and describe our scheme in detail. In Sect. 4 required adaptations to apply the scheme to IEEE 802.11i like environments are given. Performance and security issues are discussed in Sect. 5 and the paper closes with some conclusions in Sect. 6.
Authentication Schemes
Mobile nodes (MN) that want to use core network services are required to authenticate themselves with the core network. When a MN enters an access network it first attaches itself to the L2 PoA. The authentication procedure with the core network is initiated either by directly contacting the L3 PoA managing that access network or in combination with an authentication required for associating with the L2 PoA. An example for the first case is an IEEE 802.11 WLAN. The L3 PoA can be contacted e.g. by assigning a temporary IP address with restricted access rights to the MN as proposed in [2] or by establishing a Point-to-Point connection using the Point-to-Point Protocol over Ethernet (PPPoE) [3] . An example for the second scenario is an IEEE 802.11i AP that authenticates a MN with the help of an AAA server. Our scheme covers both scenarios. We define it for the first, simpler scenario in detail, and describe necessary adaptations for IEEE 802.11i environments in Sect. 4.
For security and maintenance reasons, the deposited authentication credentials used for authenticating a user are not directly available to the L3 PoA but rather centrally stored on an AAA server. The L3 PoA relays the authentication messages of both the MN and the AAA server and, at the end, is informed by the AAA server whether it should allow the MN to access the network or not. Message authentication for L3 signalling traffic is implemented by using key material established when the MN and the network (represented by the AAA server) authenticate each other. As the L3 PoA has to be able to create and verify authenticated messages, the AAA server transmits the necessary key material to the L3 PoA over a secured channel.
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [4] and the Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) [5] are two widely-used protocols for authentication purposes. EAP provides a flexible framework allowing arbitrary authentication mechanisms. In our scenario it is used for the communication between the MN and the AAA server in which the L3 PoA acts as authenticator in pass-through mode. RADIUS is used to transport information between the AAA server and the L3 PoA. As an example scenario, to which our re-authentication scheme can be applied, in the following the authentication procedure based on Transport Layer Security (TLS) [6] is briefly described for an IEEE 802.11 environment.
The PPP EAP TLS Authentication Protocol as defined in [7] provides mutual authentication between an EAP client (here: the MN) and an EAP server (here: the AAA server) and allows to establish key material to be used for a subsequent secure communication. The L3 PoA (here: the AR) acts as the EAP authenticator. In [7] a specific EAP method called EAP-TLS is standardized that defines the transport of TLS messages within EAP messages.
The message flow for the registration of a MN with an access network is depicted in Fig. 1 (a). After associating with the AP, a link between the MN and the AR is established, e.g. by running PPPoE.
An EAP-Identity-Request is issued by the AR that is answered by the client with an EAP-Identity-Response containing an identifier. According to [4] , EAPIdentity-Requests can optionally contain data to be displayed to the user and, additionally, data to be used as initialization of subsequent authentication methods. We exploit this option to implement our fast re-authentication procedure. Therefore, in Fig. 1 eIdentity. The additionally transported public key Publ AR is an optional parameter and is ignored during startup.
As the AR has no access to the credentials for authenticating a MN, it acts as a RADIUS client and contacts the AAA server acting as RADIUS server. In [8] two attributes (EAP-Message and Message-Authenticator) are introduced to support an authenticated EAP message transport within RADIUS packets. The authentication is based on a secret key S AR−AAA that has to be established between the AR and the AAA server by other means.
The actual EAP TLS authentication procedure uses a public key infrastructure based on certificates. Within three round trips, both the MN and the AAA server submit a random number, their public key along with a certificate chain proving the key's authenticity, and signatures computed over the messages exchanged so far to authenticate themselves. Furthermore, the MN sends a premaster secret, i.e. a random number of appropriate length, encrypted with the server's public key. The master key, i.e. the shared key material between the AAA server and the MN, is computed from these random numbers and the premaster secret.
If the EAP TLS authentication procedure is successfully finished the AAA server will send a RADIUS-Access-Accept packet to inform the AR that the MN is authenticated and can be given access to the network. This packet also contains the established master key encapsulated e.g. into MS-MPPE-Send-Key and MS-MPPE-Recv-Key attributes defined in [9] . In order to particularly protect this message, the whole communication between the AR and the AAA server should be protected by e.g. IPsec. Finally, the AR issues a EAP-Success-Message to the MN which then gets configured and registered with the core network.
As indicated in Fig. 1 (a) the conventional authentication procedure consists of several round trips between the MN and the AAA server. Furthermore, when using public key certificate chains the verification of certificates can become a time-consuming task. As packet-switched multimedia applications like video streaming or VoIP benefit from a minimal link downtime during HO, the reauthentication scheme has to be as fast as possible.
On the other hand, malicious nodes have to be prevented from misusing the re-authentication method in any way. Therefore, the new key material between a MN and its new AR should be as strong as the old one.
Attacker model
Attackers the network has to be protected from are assumed to be mobile stations located within communication range of a MN and/or AP and trying to retrieve valuable information by eavesdropping the channel and injecting forged messages. We only consider the signalling traffic between a MN and its AR and do not address security issues on the transport or application layer as appropriate measures are available (e.g. IPsec, VPN, SSL, etc.). Furthermore, we assume that the fixed infrastructure components like ARs and AAA servers are not compromised, behave according to the protocol, and do not collude with malicious MNs. AAA servers accept RADIUS requests only from registered ARs and the communication between an AR and its AAA server is encrypted and authenticated. This can be achieved by configuring both peers with a shared secret key or by using mutually authenticated IPsec channels.
In our attacker model the attacker has the following capabilities:
-Eavesdropping: The attacker is able to retrieve all data packets sent over the air interface. If an encryption mechanism is in use, the attacker can only read the packet's content if it is in possession of the decryption key. -Forging: The attacker is able to compile arbitrary packets and has full control over the packets' headers and data parts. -Simulating infrastructure devices and network services: An attacker is able to simulate wireless access points, base stations, service gateways, etc. as long as the needed information is publicly available or has been gathered in previous attacks. -No resource limitations: The attacker does not suffer from power or computational limitations that battery driven devices normally have to deal with.
Without an appropriate protection of the signalling traffic between a MN and its AR the above defined attacker would have several possibilities to attack the network. It could send forged HO requests in the name of other mobile nodes to the AR and may disconnect that node from the network. Furthermore, it could request core network services in the name of other nodes and by this gather sensitive information or trigger reconfiguration procedures. If the attacker intercepts a regular HO request it could try to connect to the destination network, pretend to be the node that requested the HO and get unauthorized network access. As the attacker is able to simulate infrastructure components, it could also pose as the new AP/AR, trick the mobile node to connect to it, and perform at least some form of denial of service or at worst gather sensitive information. As HOs between access networks of different providers are supported it might be interesting for an old provider to further eavesdrop the signalling communication between the MN and the new provider after the HO.
Consequently, when a mobile node M performs a HO from an access network managed by the access router OA into an access network managed by NA, several requirements have to be fulfilled by the underlying re-authentication scheme:
-NA has to recognize M as being authorized to access the network. Furthermore, in order to preserve higher level security associations based on constant addresses, M should be assigned the same network address in the new access network as it had been configured with in the old one. -The new key material for a secured channel between M and NA has to be exchanged in such a way that (1) NA cannot determine the key used between M and OA and (2) OA cannot derive the new key used by M and NA. -Unauthorized nodes are not able to exploit the protocol to get network access or gather any other advantages. -The delay caused by the authentication procedure has to be low.
Re-authentication Scheme
For our re-authentication scheme we assume that a secret key S MN−oAR has been established between the MN and the old AR that can be used to exchange secured messages. Generally, this key is exchanged during startup. Furthermore, we assume the existence of a protected channel between the old AR and the new AR based on the key S oAR−nAR established via manual configuration or by using e.g. the Internet Key Exchange protocol. In practice, an AR will probably not have very many neighbor ARs so that a manual configuration might be feasible. From the security point of view we have authenticated relationships between the MN and the old AR and between the old AR and the new AR. Our goal is to establish such a relationship between the MN and the new AR.
The message sequence of our fast re-authentication scheme is depicted in Fig. 1 (b) . The MN sends a HO notification message to its current AR. It contains information about the destination access network and an authentication ticket AuthTicket consisting of a sequence number used to prevent replay attacks and the actual authentication information (MN ID, nMK ) SK to be forwarded to the new AR.
nMK is the new, randomly chosen master key between the MN and the new AR. MN ID is the ID of the MN and is used to bind nMK to that particular MN. In order to disguise nMK from the old AR the authentication information is encrypted with the randomly chosen key SK. The AuthTicket is encrypted and authenticated by using the current session key S MN−oAR .
When the old AR receives the AuthTicket it verifies the sequence number and forwards a Ticket, as an attribute of a RADIUS-Access-Request packet, over the previously established secured channel to the new AR.
The old AR prepends the MN ID of the MN with which it shares S MN−oAR to the authentication information. By this, the new AR later can verify that the MN ID provided by the MN is the same as the one the MN has used to authenticate with the old AR. Along with the Ticket a reconfiguration context is submitted, i.e. information necessary to reconfigure the MN in the new access network. The new AR stores the Ticket, starts a timer, and waits for the MN to enter the network and request a fast re-authentication. If the MN does not show up before the timer runs out, the Ticket will be deleted. In order to reauthenticate itself to the new access network, the MN has to prove its knowledge of nMK stored in the corresponding Ticket. Furthermore, the new AR has to be enabled to extract nMK from the Ticket while preventing the old AR from doing the same.
After the conventional open system authentication with the new AP and the link establishment with the new AR, e.g. via PPPoE, the new AR requests the MN to authenticate itself. At this point in time, the new AR does not know, whether it has to handle a conventional or a fast re-authentication. As in the startup example, the new AR sends an extended EAP-Identity-Request called EAP-eIdentity that contains its public key Publ nAR . A MN can answer to this request with a conventional EAP-Identity-Response, thus initiating the conventional authentication scheme as described in Sect. 2. Alternatively, it can provide the re-authentication ticket ReAuthTicket and get authenticated immediately 1 .
ReAuthTicket := {MN ID, oAR, (SK ) P ublnAR , HMAC nMK (Publ nAR )}
The MN ID in the ReAuthTicket aims at identifying the correct Ticket from the list of currently pending tickets at the new AR. The address of the old AR oAR enables the new AR to contact the old AR in case that the correct Ticket has not yet been received. The secret key SK used to encrypt nMK in (2) is encrypted with Publ nAR . The old AR is therefore prevented from getting knowledge of SK by eavesdropping the ReAuthTicket. The last component is a hashed message authentication code (HMAC) computed over Publ nAR and seeded with nMK. On the one hand it is generated to prove knowledge of nMK and on the other hand to indicate that it is generated to answer an EAP-eIdentity-Request with Publ nAR . The new AR uses its private key to extract SK from (3) and uses SK to decrypt the new master key nMK and the encrypted MN ID from (2). By verifying that both MN IDs from (2) match, it is ensured that the MN has transmitted the MN ID it has used to authenticate itself with the core network. A successful verification of the HMAC provided in (3) proves that the issuer of the ReAuthTicket knows nMK. As the Ticket comes from a trusted peer (the old AR) to which the MN had authenticated itself, the MN is successfully authenticated with the new AR and the IP address stored in the reconfiguration context can be assigned to the MN with ID MN ID. Finally, the core network is informed about the performed HO operation and the new AR can delete the used ticket from its list of pending tickets. Although intended to be used in predictive mode it is also possible to apply the re-authentication scheme in reactive mode. For this, the MN would have to transmit the AuthTicket (1) along with the ReAuthTicket (3) in the EAPIdentity-Response. The new AR would transmit the AuthTicket to the old AR which could then transmit the reconfiguration context along with the Ticket (2) to the new AR. Afterwards, the verification of the ReAuthTicket can be performed as described above.
In the case the MN decides to re-attach itself to the old AR instead of the new AR, the fast re-authentication can be applied analogously, with the special case that old AR and new AR are identical.
Application to IEEE 802.11i environments
In IEEE 802.11i environments an AP itself runs authentication procedures. It can be configured to act as an EAP authenticator and to negotiate a master key between a MN and itself by using the mechanisms described in Sect. 2. As the AR is no longer actively involved in this process a key between the MN and the AR used to protect L3 signalling traffic is not established.
As a solution we propose to configure the AP to use its AR as RADIUS server. With exception of the final RADIUS-Access-Accept packet, the AR acts like a RADIUS proxy by relaying the RADIUS packets between AAA server and AP (cf. Fig. 2 (a) ). The MN and the AAA server negotiate a master key MK MN−AR by running EAP-TLS and the AAA server transmits MK MN−AR in its final RADIUS-Access-Accept packet to the AR. The AR uses MK MN−AR on the one hand to derive session keys for a secured communication with the MN and on the other hand to derive the master key MK MN−AP for the AP with a publicly-known one-way function. MK MN−AP is transmitted to the AP in the corresponding RADIUS-Access-Accept packet. On receipt of the EAP-SuccessMessage from the AP, the MN also computes MK MN−AP from MK MN−AR .
Analogously, the fast re-authentication is implemented for this scenario (cf. Fig. 2 (b) ). The ticket is created in the same manner as described before and transmitted via the old AR to the new AR. After a successful L2 re-association the re-authentication is slightly different from the one illustrated in Fig. 1 (b) . The new AP has to start the authentication procedure by sending the initial EAP-eIdentity-Request containing its AR's public key Publ nAR . The corresponding EAP-Response with the re-authentication ticket inside is addressed to the new AP being from the MN's point of view the EAP authenticator. The new 
Evaluation
In this section the fast re-authentication scheme is evaluated according to the requirements of Sect. 3.1.
Security evaluation
The security evaluation of the proposed re-authentication scheme is based on the assumptions that the underlying cryptographic functions are secure and that random numbers are not predictable. Furthermore, we assume that the EAP TLS authentication with RADIUS as described in Sect. 2 is secure. On the one hand it has to be shown that authorized nodes -clients as well as servers -are able to successfully perform a fast re-authentication. On the other hand any attacker with capabilities as described in Sect. 3.1 must be prevented from misusing the scheme to get any advantages.
